Introduction
Despite ongoing advances in communication technology, firms' geographic location is still shaping corporate behavior. Previous studies show that proximate investors, both individuals and institutions, are more likely to favor nearby firms because of their ability to oversee management when the distance between shareholders and firms is small. For example, many venture capitalists (VCs) limit their investments to the geographic area within a 20-minute drive, as was the case of Facebook, among other, that received its first round of financing (about $12.7 million) from Accel Partners one year after locating four blocks away from the venture firm (Tian, 2011) , partly because VCs are more reticent to visit or sit in boards of more geographically distant portfolio firms (Lerner, 1995) . Moreover, since the finding of Coval and Moskowitz (1999) that investors prefer local companies, a number of studies document that locality is associated with more liquid stocks (Loughran and Schultz, 2005) , advantageous information on acquisition activity (Kang and Kim, 2008) , better price formation in securities markets (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006) and lower behavioral biases (Giannini et al., 2013) . This evidence suggests that proximity to firms' location can improve the way in which investors and corporate officials can access and assess company's information, and thereby contribute to the decision-making process.
We focus on the effect of distance on corporate cash holdings. We argue that corporate geographic location affects the ability of outsiders to monitor the controlling shareholder's actions including those on cash holdings. Our conjecture is that cash management policies are less observable in remotely located firms, which gives the controlling shareholder opportunities to pursue private benefits by accumulating cash rather than disgorging it in investments or dividends. This view is associated with the notion that insiders are willing to hoard cash exceeding the firm needs, since the unused cash can be easily diverted to personal consumption or spent in investments that negatively affect firm value (Faleye, 2004; Harford, 1999; Harford et al., 2008; Jensen, 1986) . We, therefore, test whether, in remotely located firms, cash holdings constitute a channel through which the controlling shareholder can obtain private benefits, because vigilant oversight against such egregious behavior is difficult to achieve.
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 4,111 observations of French listed firms over the period 1998 to 2007. We measure remoteness by the distance between the location of firms'
headquarters and the Paris region to capture the extent of monitoring costs. We expect firms that are located inside the Paris region to have a large number of adjacent investors and lower monitoring costs compared to their remote counterparts. Consistent with our predictions, we find that cash holding increases as firms' distance from the Paris region increases, and that firms located in the Paris region set significantly lower cash holdings than their remotely located counterparts. These results provide evidence that large cash holdings are associated with the impaired ability to monitor managerial actions of remotely located firms. We next examine the extent to which distance influences cash when control rights and cash-flow rights are separated.
We find that the positive effect of distance on cash is more pronounced in firms that exhibit large separation of cash-flow and control rights. These results are consistent with the notion that firms incur higher agency costs when geographic remoteness is coupled with a large separation of cashflow rights and control rights.
An alternative explanation of our result may be that distant firms hoard cash because they face greater financial constraints as they have high information asymmetry due to little transparency and few corporate disclosures (Ali et al., 2007; Attig et al., 2006; Fan and Wong, 2002 ) and/or they incur high costs of external finance (Arena and Dewally, 2012) . We test this conjecture by using payout ratio as a proxy of financial constraints. We find that the effect of distance on cash held by firms with excess control rights is indifferent to the degree of their financial constraints, thus lending additional support for the agency motive for cash holdings. We consider, however, that the use of payout in our case may be problematic because according to La Porta et al. (2000) weak governance firms may pay low dividends if payouts emanate from a legal protection of minority shareholders (outcome model) or high dividends if they are substitute for weak shareholder protection (substitute model). 1 We, therefore, provide a number of robustness tests by using firm size, the adjusted Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , AKZ, and the adjusted Whited and Wu (2006) , AWW, indices, as alternative measures of financial constraints.
In addition we account for endogeneity issues, test robustness of our results to alternative sample composition, and consider different statistical approaches. We find relatively similar results.
While our focus is mainly on the agency explanation of cash, we also account for the predictions of the two other theories, namely the trade-off and the pecking order theories. The trade-off theory emphasizes the transaction cost and precautionary motives for holding cash and suggests that firms, in the absence of agency conflicts, determine their optimal cash policies by balancing the marginal costs and benefits of these liquid assets. On the other hand, the peckingorder theory emphasizes the informational asymmetries between managers and investors and explains the role of cash as a buffer between retained earnings and investment needs. These two theories suggest the impact of the following firm specific variables, among others, on cash reserves which we include in our analysis: capital expenditures, cash flow, dividend, market-tobook ratio, leverage, net working capital, size, and cash flow volatility. Our results are strong even after accounting for these effects.
Our research contributes to prior literature in several ways. Almazan et al. (2010) develop an analytical model in support of the view that geographically clustered firms tend to have more investment opportunities, and require increased cash holdings to undertake more acquisitions. Landier et al. (2009) show that firms' geographic dispersion substantially affects labor and divestiture policies. Kedia et al. (2008) provide evidence that bidders obtain higher returns when they target geographically proximate firms. Loughran (2008) contends that rural firms are less inclined to issue equity than their metropolitan peers due to the presence of distance-related 1 For further empirical evidence on the outcome and substitute models, see, for example, Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012), Brockman and Unlu (2009), Faccio et al. (2001) , La Porta et al., (2000) , Mitton (2004) , and Shao et al. (2013) . John et al. (2011) suggests that since distance engenders considerable free cash flow, remote firms may pre-commit to higher dividends to decrease agency costs of such free cash flow, in line with Stulz (1990) .
information frictions. We expand this evidence by focusing on the effects of remoteness on cash holdings, and provide new insight into the way geographic factors alter firm behavior.
Our research also adds to the corporate governance literature that identifies agency motives as contributing to large holdings of cash (see, e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Harford et al., 2008) . Agency costs associated with liquid assets are particularly high when control rights are higher than cash-flow rights. Masulis et al. (2009) , for instance, acknowledge that greater separation of insiders' voting rights and cash flow rights results in more expropriation of cash reserves, leading to a decrease in the value of cash holdings. Becker et al. (2011) use the geographical proximity of large shareholders as an instrument for their monitoring power to find that superior monitoring exerted by large shareholders (i.e., nearby blockholders) tends to mitigate agency problems by reducing corporate cash holdings. We expand this trend in the literature by investigating the effect of firm location on cash holdings in an agency theory framework.
Our analysis is conducted under the French system typically characterized by a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights (Faccio and Lang, 2002) . In such an environment, controlling shareholders have power over the firm's resources that exceed their cash-flow rights allowing them to convert these resources, including cash balances, into private benefits. Using geographic remoteness as a proxy for monitoring costs, a likely implication is that excess control rights would exacerbate agency costs associated with the liquid assets of remotely located firms. We show how the separation of the controlling shareholder's cash-flow and control rights affects the relation between geographic location and cash holdings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents summary statistics and univariate analysis. Section 5 discusses the results of multivariate analysis. Section 6 reports the results of several robustness checks. In Section 7 we test for endogeneity. Section 8 summarizes the main findings and concludes the paper. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) argue that investors have strong preferences for nearby firms. They show that U.S. mutual fund portfolios are biased toward neighbor firms and that household investors outperform their distant counterparts given that investors are better off with nearby firms. Hau (2001) argues that proximity to core financial professionals may provide investors with more opportunities for acquiring first-hand and low-cost information so as to optimize their investment portfolios. Wrigley et al. (2003) contend that financial professionals are more prone to develop knowledge spillovers in the vicinity of local business networks that afford them more opportunities for direct and privileged relationships with company officials. In contrast, distant investors are less able to closely inspect corporate management, and, thus, to provide effective monitoring because of decreased visibility of managerial actions at greater distances, and to acquire specific knowledge about firm's operations or a deep understanding of its technical and cultural characteristics (Gaspar and Massa, 2007) .
Review of the literature and hypotheses tested

Firms' geographic location and cash holdings
Preferences for more proximate firms may also be driven by familiarity. Huberman (2001) argues that investors are more willing to invest in firms that they can observe directly and follow in local media. Zhu (2002) states that heavy spending on advertising and marketing is prone to increase investors' familiarity with the firm. Consistent with this view, Barber and Odean (2005) argue that regular corporate news releases and local social networks develop familiarity making firms more attractive to nearby investors. Alternatively, geographic remoteness leads investors to be less familiar with the company matters. Distant investors may therefore incur relatively high oversight costs, which probably undermine their monitoring incentives and abilities.
Previous studies also document the implications of this distance. Petersen and Rajan (2002) contend that banks are less likely to grant credit to distant firms where internal operations are not well observable, since assessment of business risks requires banks to have close formal and informal relationships with their borrowers. Mian (2006) finds that agency costs arising from cultural differences and geographical remoteness frequently prevent foreign banks from lending local firms with low-visibility operations. Grote and Täube (2006) and Bae et al. (2008) show that financial analysts follow more nearby firms since they can easily have regular face-to-face conversations with officials and board members of local firms, which affects the way data integrity and rumors are addressed. Masulis et al. (2012) analyze the effectiveness of boards of directors including foreign members and report that independent directors who usually reside abroad are less inclined to regularly attend board meetings and to capitalize on specific knowledge through on-site visits leading to decreased monitoring performance.
We expand these impacts to the possibility that in remotely located firms, controlling shareholders may hold abnormally large cash reserves which may lead to agency problems, especially when investment opportunities are low. A large number of previous studies examine the effect of corporate governance quality on cash holdings and conclude that managers of poorly governed firms accumulate more cash which is more likely to be spent in investments that negatively affect firm value (e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Harford et al., 2008; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Kusnadi, 2011) . Other studies find strong evidence that poor protection of shareholders rights is associated with a considerable decrease in the value of cash holdings (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Drobetz et al., 2010) .
We expect the agency costs associated with hoarding cash to be influenced by firms' geographic location, as remoteness of firms' headquarters may decrease the observability of managerial actions and thereby makes monitoring tasks costly. The costs of management monitoring are likely to be lower in the vicinity of corporate decision-makers. In this thread, Baik et al. (2010) allege that local institutional investors are likely to be good monitors because geographic proximity allows them to build long-term relationships with corporate decisionmakers. Chen et al. (2010) argue that firms clustering around metropolitan areas are followed by a large number of specialized financial professionals, which increases the visibility of managerial actions and thus decreases the costs of their monitoring. John et al. (2011) show that distance generates considerable agency costs of free cash flow leading firms located away from the ten largest US metropolitan areas to increase their dividend payouts as a way to mitigate such costs. Ayers et al. (2011) document that managers' discretion over financial reporting increases with the geographic remoteness of institutional investors from a firm's headquarters; they conclude that monitoring costs incurred by these investors increase with distance. Similarly, Chhaochharia et al. (2012) find that corporate monitoring is more effective when excreting by local institutional investors than by their non-local counterparts. These arguments motivate our first hypothesis:
Corporate cash holdings increase with distance from metropolitan areas.
Excess control rights, firms' geographic location and cash holdings
Distance from metropolitan areas may limit shareholders' ability to provide close and valuable monitoring of managerial actions, including those linked to cash management. The presence of controlling shareholders with more control rights than cash-flow rights ostensibly exacerbates the adverse effects that location has on corporate policies due to the potentially high agency costs of excess control rights. Extensive corporate governance literature provides empirical evidence that larger divergence between cash flow rights and control rights results in lower firm value (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Lins, 2003) . Morck et al. (2005) contend that family-controlled firms with higher separation of cash-flow rights and control rights undertake less profitable acquisitions compared to other family firms. Masulis et al. (2009) show that larger divergence between voting rights and the equity ownership of insiders (i.e., officers and directors) is associated with lower value of cash holdings, higher CEO compensation, value-destroying acquisitions and unprofitable capital expenditures. In support of this agency view, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) find that the cost of borrowing increases with excess control rights. Gompers et al. (2010) claim that insiders of dual-class firms often hold voting rights in excess of cash flow rights, and that U.S. firms are more likely to adopt dual-class status when private benefits of control are relatively high. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010) report that the adoption of dual-class structures decreases firm value, particularly when equity interests of the controlling shareholder are not substantial.
Agency problems driven by distance are probably more severe when there is a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. In this spirit, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) show that for Swedish listed firms, the presence of excess control rights within a firm decreases the probability that foreign investors hold that stock. Kim et al. (2011) 
Baseline model specification
To investigate the relation between geographic location and cash holdings, we supplement the following cash model as developed by Opler et al. (1999) with geographic variables and industry and year fixed effects:
where Cash is cash holdings computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets defined as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. We use the logarithmic transformation to reduce problems associated with skewness and to mitigate the influence of outlier observations. Appendix 1 provides a description of our variables. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile levels to reduce effects of outliers and our regression estimates are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level (Peterson, 2009 ).
To determine the geographical location, we first obtain the four-digit ZIP code of the county in which the firm is headquartered the year it entered Worldscope database.
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We next estimate its proximity relative to Paris, the French financial centre (Guillain and Le Gallo, 2010) using three proxies. 4 First, we define Distance as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers between firm's i headquarter and Paris, P, using the arc-length formula, as in Coval and Moskowitz (1999) : 
where r is the radius of the earth (6378 km); lat is latitude; and lon is longitude. and outer-ring suburbs (77, 78, 91, 95) .
We use a number of control variables. Following Opler et al. (1999) , cash holdings can be explained by a number of firm characteristics. Firm size can be negative due to the presence of economies of scale in holding liquid assets (Miller and Orr, 1966) , or positive if larger firms bring about more investment opportunities that, in turn, require more cash (Opler et al., 1999) . We use market-to-book to account for the need of growth firms to hoard cash, particularly when external finance is costly (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Research and development (R&D) is expected to have a positive effect on cash holdings as it is a proxy for financial distress costs. Cash flow assesses whether higher cash flow leads to greater cash accumulation. Net working capital is non-cash liquid resources that, as a substitute for cash, should negatively affect the level of cash holdings (Kim et al., 1998) . Cash flow volatility accounts for the possibility that higher cash flow uncertainty is associated with larger cash holdings. Leverage controls for the fact that cash is generally affected by debt repayment. Capital expenditure decreases cash holding as it constitutes a preferred source of financing (Harford, 1999) . Similarly, dividends will decrease cash. Cash Flow, R&D and Cash Flow Volatility. 6 The positive correlation between the distance from Paris and cash holding is substantiated by the results from the univariate analysis reported in Table 2 , independently of the definition of distance used. These findings are consistent with the notion that remotely located firms provide a favorable environment for pillingup cash. These firms feature, indeed, considerable monitoring costs, a context that increases the controlling shareholder's likelihood to entrench themselves and thus to misuse the built-up cash.
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Market
[Insert Table 1 and 2 here] 6 The variance inflation factor shows that multicollinearity is not a concern that would seriously affect our empirical results. The highest variance inflation factor value is 1.69, below the rule-of-thumb critical value of 10 (Gujarati, 2003) . The correlation results are in Appendix 3.
Multivariate analysis
In this section, we first examine the effect of geography on corporate cash holding. We then assess the impact of excess control rights. 
Firms' geographic location and cash holding
We include Excess Control to account for the possibility that agency costs implied by excess control rights affect the way cash is managed. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. We are interested in the coefficient β 2 , which estimates the impact that excess control rights have on location's effect on corporate cash holdings. Hypothesis H 2 predicts that excess control rights 7 We use industry dummies in all regressions to account for the fact that Services and Consumer Durables are the most common sectors, representing 24.15% and 19.63% of all observations, respectively, compared to the Petroleum industry with only 0.78%, but whose firms are all headquartered in the Paris region, followed by the exacerbate the location effect on cash holdings, as agency problems are expected to be particularly important at high levels of excess control rights. We hence expect β 2 to be positive.
We first examine location's effect on cash using the continuous geographic variables Distance (Column 1) and Road Distance (Column 2). The results indicate that β 2 is positive and statistically significant for both variables. This suggests that the level of cash increases when remoteness from the Paris region is coupled with greater excess control rights of the controlling shareholder. We obtain similar results when we use geography dummies, Outside_Paris (Column 3) and Distance_Dummy (Column 4). The location effect on cash is therefore amplified in the presence of a controlling shareholder owning higher control rights than cash-flow rights.
The control variables are not reported as they did not change.
In summary, our findings show that remotely located firms hoard more cash when excess control rights are high, in line with our predictions of hypothesis H 2 . Central to this is that separating cash-flow rights and control rights is closely associated with considerable monitoring costs by outsiders, thus providing the controlling shareholder with a greater ability to hoard cash for personal consumption (Jiang et al., 2011) . Accordingly, accumulating cash in firms where remoteness from institutional investors and financial professionals is coupled with excess control rights may signal the relevance of agency problems in altering the management of cash. Our results hold even after accounting for the control variables, which we do not report as they are relatively similar to Panel A.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Impact of financial constraints on distance and cash holdings
An alternative explanation is that remotely located firms experiencing excess control rights accumulate cash because of their increased difficulties in raising external finance. In this sense, Opler et al. (1999) contend that cash can be held for precautionary motives, so that firms can buffer against unexpected negative cash flow shocks without incurring additional costs from raising external finance. Central to this view is that separation of cash-flow rights and control rights is associated with high information asymmetry due to little transparency and low corporate disclosures (Fan and Wong, 2002; Attig et al., 2006; Ali et al., 2007) . In addition, the high cost of getting information on remotely located firms may make external finance costly (Arena and Dewally, 2012) . Based on these arguments, it is plausible that firms located away from the Paris area retain more cash because they face greater financial constraints.
To test this hypothesis, we first use payout as a proxy for financial constraints. We expect firms with high dividend payouts to have sufficient internal funds at their disposal to honor their contractual obligations and to meet their shareholders' expectations, and are, therefore, less likely to be financially constrained. In contrast, financially constrained firms will tend to reduce their payouts to provide internal finance for their future investments (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988) . Thus, firms with greater proportion of cash payout via dividends are presumed to be less financially constrained. The results reported in Table 4 show that the impact of excess control rights and distance on cash holdings is relatively similar across constrained and unconstrained firms.
However, the relationship between governance and dividend is not clear, since firms with weak governance may pay low or high dividends depending on whether they adhere to the outcome or substitution models developed by La Porta et al. (2000) . In Table 4 , we use alternative measures of financial constraints, namely firm size, adjusted Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , AKZ, index, and adjusted Whited and Wu (2006) , AWW, index. Previous empirical studies highlight that, larger firms may face fewer financial constraints because they are ostensibly more mature and transparent for outsiders (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) . Alternatively, financial constraints may be a function of a combination of firms' fundamental factors. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) develop an index based on five firm characteristics, namely, cash flow, investment opportunities, leverage, cash dividends and cash holdings.
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The higher this index, the higher the financial constraints, as when firms, particularly those with good investment opportunities, face difficulties in raising external finance, they exhaust their internal funds and their cash balances, provide small cash dividends, and reach their debt capacities. We adjust this model to reflect the financial constraint status for a broader set of French firms, following the empirical approach of Baker et al. (2003) . Similarly, Whited and Wu (2006) index is based on six firm characteristics that reflect rare financial resources, namely, cash flow, dividends, long term debt, firm size, sales growth and industry sales growth. A higher WW index implies that financial constraints are more severe. We also adapt this index to French firms, AWW, as in AKZ, above. The details on these proxy variables are in Appendix 1, Panel C.
The results reported in the last six columns of Table 4 are qualitatively similar indicating that, in the presence of high levels of excess control rights, the level of cash held by remote firms is not determined by corporate financial constraints. Overall, our results suggest that remote firms hold abnormally large cash balances regardless of their ability to raise external finance, and provide further evidence that agency motives are behind large cash holdings.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Robustness checks
In this section, we perform a series of sensitivity analysis tests to check the robustness of our results. Notably, we employ alternative measures of the dependent variable and the variables of interest. We also use alternative statistical approaches as well as alternative sample compositions and an alternative model specification. Table 5 reports the results of robustness checks using alternative measurements of the main variables used in Equation 4. The control variables are not reported as they did not change.
Robustness to alternative measures of variables
In Panel A, we first use industry-adjusted cash-to-net assets (Column 1), cash-to-sales (Column 2), and cash-to-assets (Column 3) as alternative proxy measures for cash holdings. Our findings consistently illustrate that the effect of distance on the cash held by firms with high excess control rights is positive and statistically significant, thus supporting hypothesis H 2 . The coefficient of β1 is also positive and statistically significant, which supports hypothesis H1.
Second, we test whether our results hinge on the geographic location metrics by using alternative dummy terms for distance, Distance100 (Column 4) and Distance300 (Column 5), which take the value 1 if the firm is, respectively, 100 and 300 kilometers distant from the Paris region.
Empirical analysis shows that the coefficient β 2 of the interaction term continues to exhibit a significant positive coefficient, consistent with the notion that firms that are distant from the Paris region hold larger cash when they experience greater separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. Lastly, we ensure that our results are robust to the measurement of excess control rights by using a continuous term, Excess Control Ratio, computed as the ratio (UCO-UCF)/UCO (Column 6), and a dummy term, Excess Control_High, taking the value 1 if the variable Excess Control Ratio is above the median of the sample of firms in which control exceeds ownership, and 0 otherwise (Column 7). The coefficient β 2 is again positive and significant, indicating that cash holding is more affected by distance at high levels of excess control rights.
In Panel B, we test for robustness of our estimation technique. First, we re-estimate Equation 4 using the random-effect estimation that take into account the panel nature of the data and allows for time-invariant geographic variables (Column 1). Our finding of a significant and positive association between excess control rights and location's effect on cash remains unchanged. Second, we rerun Equation 4 using the Fama-MacBeth procedure that estimates cross-sectional regressions separately for each year (Column 2). The coefficient β 2 continues to be positive and statistically significant. We furthermore employ the Fama-MacBeth estimation with Newey-West standard errors (Column 3). This approach accounts for serial correlation using a first-order autoregressive process (Haggard et al., 2008; Jin and Myers, 2006) . Our findings remain consistent with the notion that distance positively affects the cash holdings of firms with a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. Third, we use a dynamic panel estimation technique, the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We address any endogeneity concerns by introducing lagged variables taken as instruments (Column 4). Although the magnitude of the interaction term estimate β 2 is different from that found using other statistical methods, this change does not affect our conclusions. Finally, we estimate in Column 5 Equation 4 using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) that cluster standard errors by both firm and geographic location (i.e., inside or outside the Paris region). The results indicate a positive and statistically significant effect of excess control rights on the cash held by remotely located firms.
The control variables are not reported, as they did not change materially.
Robustness to alternative sample composition and model specification
In Table 5 , Panel C, we report results based on alternative sample compositions and model specification. In Column 1, we follow Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Malloy (2005) and restrict our analysis to firms located outside the Paris region where 62.88% in our sample firms are headquartered (see Appendix 2). In Column 2, we check that our results are not due to the exclusion of firms with no controlling shareholder (i.e., widely held firms) by including firms in which the largest shareholder owns less than 10% of control rights and assigning a value 0 to the variable Excess Control Ratio. In Column 3 we rerun Equation 4 after excluding observations for which the controlling shareholder owns more than half of the firm's capital stock ownership. In this way we account for the possibility that the controlling shareholder's impetus for obtaining private benefits may subside when this shareholder enjoy substantial financial interest derived from their equity ownership, as the personal wealth of large shareholders is closely tied to firm value, making them less likely to misuse the accumulated cash at their disposal (Claessens et al., 2002) . In Column 4 we test for the possibility that cash is driven by internal capital markets as there is evidence that group-affiliated firms have increased opportunities to be propped up by receiving cash assistance from internal capital markets (Bertrand et al., 2002; Cheung et al., 2006) . Finally, in Column 5, we run sensitivity analyses using an alternative cash model. [Insert Table 5 here] Table 6 reports the results of the various specifications we use to deal with the potential endogeneity of the geographic location of firms' headquarters. In Column 1, we consider that the choice of headquarter location can be dictated by the nature of certain industries, such as mining and agriculture (El Ghoul et al., 2012; John et al., 2011) , making distance to metropolitan areas to be independent of agency problems arising from geographic remoteness. We, therefore, re-run Equation 4 using only the primary sectors identified as agricultural (SIC codes 0100-0999) and mining (SIC codes 1000-1499, excluding SIC codes 1300-1399). In Column 2 we account for the possibility that firm size determines the geographic location of firms' headquarters since large firms tend to be located in the core regions and that relocations are more frequent in small-sized firms (e.g., John et al., 2011) . The results obtained for the sample of large firms (i.e., total assets in excess of €100 million) are in line with those for the whole sample.
Endogeneity tests
Since important technology changes over time are likely to improve management visibility and reduce monitoring costs, thus mitigating the effect of distance on cash, we test whether our results are stronger in earlier sample period (pre-1998), by running Equation 4 using only firms that are listed on the French market before 1998 (Column 3). Our results confirm that location's effect on cash is considerable, as β 2 increases to 0.015, suggesting that agency costs due to excess control rights are higher when distance is accompanied by fewer possibilities to oversee management. In Column 4, we extend the sample period back to 1990 to capture the time effects that technological developments have on distance barriers by interacting Distance and Excess Control with the variable Pre-1998, a dummy that takes the value 1 if a firm existed before the beginning of our sample period, and 0 otherwise. Our results yield the same positive and significant location effect on cash. [Insert Table 6 here]
Conclusion
We test the hypothesis that monitoring the management is potentially less effective for firms that are located in remote areas because of the lower observability of managerial actions.
We focus on the effects of distance on corporate cash holdings as a primary corporate policy.
Using a sample of 4,111 observations of publicly listed French firms over a period extending from 1998 to 2007, we find that the controlling shareholder can accumulate cash as a way to increase opportunities to obtain private benefits by converting more cash into private benefits when their firms are headquartered outside the Paris region leading to severe agency problems. We also find that the positive effect of distance on cash is amplified when combined with a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. Our results provide evidence that remotely located firms keep markedly larger cash holdings when the controlling shareholder is more entrenched. Our results hold even after accounting for a number of control variables, for cash constraints and a battery of robustness checks to test for alternative proxy variables and statistical specifications.
Our results provide evidence that geographic remoteness plays a key role in altering corporate cash policies. Remote firms are more inclined to accumulate cash because of the lower observability of their managerial actions that makes their monitoring costly, especially is the presence of a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights of the controlling shareholder.
While our evidence is limited to the French case, further research will highlight the extent to which cash management in remotely located firms constitutes a channel for extracting private benefits by the controlling shareholder when its interests are at odds with those of other shareholders is not country dependent. 
Appendix 1-Variables' description
Variable Definition
Panel A. Main variables Cash
Cash holdings computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities.
Distance
Natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region.
Road Distance
Natural logarithm of one plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris region.
Outside_Paris
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is located outside the Paris region, and 0 otherwise.
Distance_Dummy
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the variable Distance is above its median value for the sample of firms that are outside the Paris region, and 0 otherwise.
Excess Control Ratio
Excess control rights of the controlling shareholder, computed as the ratio (UCO-UCF)/UCO, where UCF (UCO) is cash-flow (control) rights of the controlling shareholder.
Excess Control Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the variable Excess Control
Ratio is above sample median, and 0 otherwise.
Firm Size
Natural logarithm of total sales (in thousands of euros).
Market-to-book
Market-to-book ratio, measured as the book value of assets, less the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity, divided by assets.
R&D
Ratio of research and development expenses to net assets.
Cash Flow
Operating income less interest and taxes, divided by net assets.
Net Working Capital
Current assets less current liabilities and cash, divided by net assets.
Cash Flow Volatility
Standard deviation of cash flow-to-net assets for the past five years.
Leverage
Ratio of total debt to total assets.
Capital Expenditure
Ratio of capital expenditure to net assets.
Dividend
Ratio of cash dividend to total assets.
Panel B. Robustness check variables
Industry adjusted cashto-net assets ratio
Industry adjusted ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets based on Campbell's (1996) classification, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities.
Cash-to sales
Ratio of cash and marketable securities to sales.
Cash-to-assets
Ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets.
Distance100
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm is headquartered outside of a 100 Kilometers to the Paris region, and 0 otherwise.
Distance300
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm is headquartered outside of a 300 Kilometers to the Paris region, and 0 otherwise.
IndAdjusted Distance
An instrument for the variable Distance. It is the two-digit industry average of Distance, in the year the firm enters the Worldscope dataset.
Excess Control_High Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the variable Excess Control
Ratio is above sample median for firms where control exceeds ownership, and 0 otherwise.
Pre-1998
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm existed before the start of our sample period, and 0 otherwise. ThreeYearSalesGrowth Three year lagged sales growth.
Panel C. Financial constraints variables
Dividend Payout Ratio Ratio of dividends to earnings.
Firm Size
The natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands of euros).
AKZ index
The adjusted Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index obtained by adjusting the coefficients estimates to reflect the financial constraint status for a broader set of French firms, following the empirical approach of Baker et al. (2003) , by reassign the weights of the original KZ index so that any of the five variables explains one-fifth of the variability of the index while keeping unchanged the signs of the weights of the variables, as follows: where KZ-Cash Flow is operating income plus depreciation divided by beginning-of-period PPE (Property, Plant and Equipment). Q is market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity all divided by book value of assets. KZ-Leverage is the ratio of total debt over total capital, where total capital is total debt plus total stockholders' equity. KZ-Dividends are cash dividends divided by beginning-of-period PPE. KZ-Cash are cash and marketable securities divided by beginningof-period PPE.
AWW index
The adjusted Whited and Wu (2006) index. Since the original WW index is developed from COMPUSTAT quarterly data for U.S. firms, we adjust it using the same approach adopted for the AKZ index, and obtain the following model: where WW-Cash Flow is operating income plus depreciation divided by beginning-of-period total assets. Dividummy is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. WWLeverage is the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. WW-Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the French consumer price index series. Sales Growth is annual percentage change in sales in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the French consumer price index (CPI) series. Industry Sales Growth is two-digit SIC industry average of Sales Growth, where industry is defined according to Campbell's (1996) industry classification.
Appendix 2-Sample characteristics
This table provides the distribution of firms by industry using Campbell's (1996) classification and by geographic location to the Paris region based on the dummy variable Outside_Paris that takes the value 1 if the firm is located outside the Paris region and 0 otherwise. N is the number of firm-year observations. Campbell's (1996) classification are included in all regressions. The sample includes 4,111 observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses next to the estimated coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980 ) and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009 Campbell's (1996) classification are included in all regressions. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses next to the estimated coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980 ) and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009 Campbell's (1996) classification, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities. In Columns 2 and 3, it is computed as the natural logarithm of cash-to-sales ratio and the natural logarithm of cash-to-assets ratio, respectively. In Columns 4-7, it is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities. In Panel B we test for statistical robustness. We use alternative statistical approaches: random-effect estimation (Column 1); Fama-MacBeth Estimation (Column 2); Fama-MacBeth Estimation with Newey-West standard errors (Column 3); system GMM (Column 4); and double clustering at the firm and location levels (Column 5). In Panel C, we use alternative sample composition: excluding Paris region firms (Column 1); including widely held firms (Column 2); excluding firms with UCF>=50% (Column 3); and excluding group-affiliated firms (Column 4). We also use reduced cash model as alternative model specification excluding Leverage, Capital Expenditure and Dividend (Column 5). All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Year dummies and industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included some specifications. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses next to the estimated coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980 ) and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009 We use the sample of firms in mining and agriculture sectors (Column 1); the sample of firms with assets above € 100 million (Column 2); the sample of firms that first listed on the French market prior to 1998 (Column 3); the 1990-2007 sample (Column 4). We use instrumental variables approach in Columns 5-8. The Dependent variable in Columns 1-4, 6 and 8 is Cash. Pre-1998 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm existed before the start of our sample period, and 0 otherwise. Year dummies and industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included but not reported. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. In Column 6, model Equation 4 is estimated with ThreeYearSalesGrowth, the three-year sales growth, as an instrument for Market-to-book. The results of the corresponding first stage regression (Market-tobook as dependent variable) are reported in Column 5. In Column 8, Equation 4 is estimated with Adjusted Distance as an instrument for Distance, where Adjusted Distance is the twodigit SIC industry average of Distance in the year the firm enters the Worldscope dataset. The results of the corresponding first stage regression (Distance as dependent variable) are reported in Column 7. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses next to the estimated coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980 ) and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009 
